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On the relationship between fuzzy logic and
four-valued relevance logic
UMBERTO STRACCIA
I.E.I. - C.N.R.
In fuzzy propositional logic, to a proposition a partial truth in [0, 1] is assigned. It is well known
that under certain circumstances, fuzzy logic collapses to classical logic. In this paper, we will
show that under dual conditions, fuzzy logic collapses to four-valued (relevance) logic, where
propositions have truth-value true,false, unknown, or contradiction. As a consequence, fuzzy
entailment may be considered as “in between” four-valued (relevance) entailment and classical
entailment.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: F.4.1 [Mathematical Logic and Formal Languages]:
Mathematical Logic—Model theory; I.2.3 [Artificial Intelligence]: Deduction and Theorem
Proving—Deduction; I.2.4 [Artificial Intelligence]: Knowledge Representation Formalisms and
Methods—Representations
General Terms: Theory
Additional Key Words and Phrases: fuzzy propositional logic, four-valued (relevance) proposi-
tional logic
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the introduction of fuzzy sets by Zadeh [1965], an impressive work has been
carried out around them, not least the numerous studies on fuzzy logic. In classical
set theory, membership of a subset S of the universe of objects U , is often viewed
as a (crisp) characteristic function µS from U to {0, 1} (called, valuation set) such
that
µS(u) =
{
1 iff u ∈ S
0 iff u 6∈ S.
In fuzzy set theory, the valuation set is allowed to be the real interval [0, 1] and
µS(u) is called the grade of membership. The closer the value to 1, the more u
belongs to S. Of course, S is a subset of U that has no sharp boundary.
When we switch to fuzzy propositional logic, the notion of grade of membership
of an element u in an universe U with respect to a fuzzy subset S over U is regarded
as the truth-value of the proposition “u is S”.
In this paper we will consider a fuzzy propositional logic in which expressions
are boolean combinations of simpler expressions of type 〈A≥n〉 and 〈A≤n〉, where
A is a propositional statement having a truth-value in [0, 1]. Both express a con-
straint on the truth-value of A, i.e. a lower bound and an upper bound, respectively
(see, e.g. [Chen and Kundu 1996; Straccia 2000]). While it is well-known that the
fuzzy entailment relation, |≈, is bounded upward by classical entailment, |=2, i.e.
there cannot be fuzzy entailment without classical entailment, in this paper we will
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establish that the fuzzy entailment relation is bounded below by the four-valued
(relevance) entailment relation described in [Anderson and Belnap 1975; Belnap
1977; Dunn 1986; Levesque 1984; Straccia 1997], in which propositions have a
truth-value true,false, unknown, or contradiction. As a consequence, fuzzy
entailment is “in between” the four-valued logical entailment relation |=4 and the
classical two-valued logic entailment relation |=2.
We proceed as follows. In the next section we introduce syntax, semantics of
the fuzzy propositional logic considered, give main definitions, describe some basic
properties and a decision procedure. In Section 3 we will present the four-valued
propositional logic considered in this paper, describe its properties and present a
decision procedure. Section 4 is the main part of this paper where the relations
among fuzzy logic, four-valued logic and classical two-valued logic are described.
Section 5 concludes.
2. A FUZZY PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC
2.1 Syntax and semantics
Our logical language has two parts. At the objective level, let L be the language
of propositional logic, with connectives ∧,∨, ¬, and the logical constants ⊥ (false)
and ⊤ (true). We will use metavariables A,B,C, . . . and p, q, r, . . . for propositions
and propositional letters, respectively.1 ⊥,⊤, letters and their negations are called
literals (denoted l). As we will see below, propositions will have a truth-value in
[0, 1].
At the meta level, let Lf be the language of meta propositions (denoted by ψ).
Lf consists of meta atoms, i.e. expressions of type 〈A≥n〉 and 〈A≤n〉, where A is a
proposition in L and n ∈ [0, 1], the connectives ∧,∨, ¬ and the logical constants ⊥
and ⊤. Essentially, a meta-atom 〈A≤n〉 constrains the truth-value of A to be less
or equal to n (similarly for ≥). But, unlike [Pavelka 1979] where the truth-value
of 〈A≤n〉 can be any number in [0, 1], in our case 〈A≥n〉 and 〈A≤n〉 will have the
truth-value 0 or 1. Furthermore, a meta letter is a meta atom of the form 〈p≥n〉
and 〈p≤n〉, where p is a propositional letter. ⊥,⊤, meta letters and their negations
are called meta literals. A meta proposition is then any ∧,∨, ¬ combination of
meta atoms. For instance, (¬〈r ∧ s≤0.6〉 ∨ 〈p ∨ q≥0.2〉) ∧ 〈r ∧ s≤0.6〉 is a meta
proposition, while (〈p≤0.3〉 ≥ 0.4) is not. We will use 〈A<n〉 as a short form of
¬〈A≥n〉 and similarly for 〈A>n〉; likewise, 〈A=n〉 is a short form for 〈A≤n〉∧〈A≥n〉.
The meta letter 〈p≥n〉 is non-trivial if n > 0, and similarly for 〈p≤n〉. The meta
letter 〈p≥1〉 corresponds to the classical letter p (p is true), and 〈p≤0〉 corresponds
to the classical literal ¬p (p is false). Therefore, Lf contains L.
The classical definitions of Negation Normal Form (NNF), Conjunctive Normal
Form (CNF) and Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF) are easily extended to our con-
text. For instance, a meta proposition ψ in negation normal form is a combination
of meta literals, using the connectives ∧ and ∨; a meta proposition ψ in conjunctive
normal form is a conjunction of disjunction of meta literals. Similarly for the DNF
case.
From a semantics point of view, an interpretation I is a mapping (·)I from
1In the following, all metavariables could have an optional subscript and superscript.
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propositional letters into [0, 1]. We extend I to propositions via the usual min,max
and 1-complement functions: ⊤I = 1, ⊥I = 0, (¬A)I = 1 − AI , (A ∧B)I =
min{AI , BI}, (A ∨B)I = max{AI , BI}.
Given an interpretation I we will assign a boolean truth-value in {0, 1} to each
meta atom in the obvious way: namely,
〈A≥n〉I = 1 iff AI ≥ n, and
〈A≤n〉I = 1 iff AI ≤ n.
Finally, we assign a boolean truth-value to each meta proposition like 〈A≥n1〉 ∨
〈B≤n2〉 using the classical method of combining truth-values and we say that an
interpretation I satisfies a meta proposition ψ iff ψI = 1; in that case, we will say
that I is a model of ψ.
A meta theory (denoted by Σ) is a finite set of meta propositions. Given an
interpretation I and a meta theory Σ, we say that I satisfies Σ if I satisfies each
ψ ∈ Σ; in that case we say that I is a model of Σ. We say that a meta theory Σ
entails a meta proposition ψ if every model of Σ is a model of ψ; this is denoted
by Σ|≈ψ. A meta proposition ψ is valid if it is entailed by the empty meta theory,
i.e. ∅|≈ψ. An example of valid meta proposition is 〈p ∨ ¬p≥0.5〉. Two propositions
A and B are said to be equivalent (denoted by A ≡ B) if AI = BI , for each
interpretation I. For example, ¬(A∧¬B) is equivalent to ¬A∨B. The equivalence
of two meta propositions, ψ ∼= ψ′ , is defined similarly.
Given a meta theory Σ and a proposition A, it is of interest to compute A’s best
lower and upper truth-value bounds [Straccia 2000]. To this end we define the least
upper bound and the greatest lower bound of A with respect to Σ (written lub(Σ, A)
and glb(Σ, A), respectively) as lub(Σ, A) = inf{n : Σ|≈〈A≤n〉} and glb(Σ, A) =
sup{n : Σ|≈〈A≥n〉}.
2.2 Some basic properties
In order to make our paper self-contained, we recall some properties of the logic
Lf , which will be of use (see [Straccia 2000]). The first ones are straightforward:
for any proposition A,B and C, ¬⊤ ≡⊥, A ∧ ⊤ ≡ A, A ∨ ⊤ ≡ ⊤, A∧ ⊥≡⊥,
A∨ ⊥≡ A, ¬¬A ≡ A, ¬(A∧B) ≡ ¬A∨¬B, ¬(A∨B) ≡ ¬A∧¬B, (A∧ (B ∨C)) ≡
(A∧B)∨(A∧C) and (A∨(B∧C)) ≡ (A∨B)∧(A∨C). It can be verified that each
proposition may easily be transformed, by preserving equivalence, into either ⊤, ⊥
or a proposition in NNF, CNF and DNF in which neither ⊤ nor ⊥ occur. Please
note, we do not have A∧¬A ≡⊥. In general we can only say that (A ∧ ¬A)I ≤ 0.5,
for any interpretation I and similarly (A ∨ ¬A)I ≥ 0.5.
Concerning meta propositions, as meta propositions have a boolean truth-value,
we have the equivalencies of classical propositional logic, e.g. ψ∧⊤ ∼= ψ, ¬ψ∧ψ ∼=⊥,
as well as
〈⊤≥n〉 ∼= ⊤
〈⊤≤n〉 ∼=
{
⊤ if n = 1
⊥ otherwise
〈p≥0〉 ∼= ⊤
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〈p≤1〉 ∼= ⊤
〈¬A≥n〉 ∼= 〈A≤1− n〉 (1)
〈A ∧B≥n〉 ∼= 〈A≥n〉 ∧ 〈B≥n〉
〈A ∨B≥n〉 ∼= 〈A≥n〉 ∨ 〈B≥n〉
and likewise for the cases ≤, < and >. Therefore, each meta proposition may easily
be transformed by, preserving equivalence, into ⊤, ⊥ or into a meta proposition in
NNF, CNF and DNF in which neither ⊤ nor ⊥ occur. Since Σ|≈⊤,Σ 6|≈ ⊥ (unless Σ
is unsatisfiable), glb(Σ,⊤) = 1, glb(Σ,⊥) = 0, lub(Σ,⊤) = 1, lub(Σ,⊥) = 0, Σ∪{⊤}
and Σ share the same set of models and Σ∪{⊥} is unsatisfiable, for the rest of the
paper, if not stated otherwise, we will always assume that meta propositions are
always in NNF in which neither trivial meta letters nor ⊤ nor ⊥ occur .
As showed in [Straccia 2000], there is a strict relation between meta propositions
and classical propositions. Let us consider the following transformation ♯(·) of meta
propositions into propositions, where ♯(·) takes the “crisp” propositional part of a
meta proposition:
♯(〈p≥n〉) 7→ p
♯(〈p≤n〉) 7→ ¬p
♯(¬ψ) 7→ ¬♯(ψ)
♯(ψ1 ∧ ψ2) 7→ ♯(ψ1) ∧ ♯(ψ2)
♯(ψ1 ∨ ψ2) 7→ ♯(ψ1) ∨ ♯(ψ2).
Further, for a meta theory Σ, ♯(Σ) = {♯(ψ) : ψ ∈ Σ}. Then the following proposition
holds.
Proposition 2.1 [Straccia 2000]. Let Σ be a meta theory and let ψ be a meta
proposition:
(1 ) if Σ is unsatisfiable then ♯(Σ) is classically unsatisfiable;
(2 ) if Σ|≈ψ then ♯(Σ) |=2 ♯(ψ), where |=2 is classical entailment.
Proposition 2.1 states that there cannot be entailment without classical entailment.
In this sense |≈ is correct with respect to |=2.
Example 2.2. Let Σ be the set Σ = {〈p≥0.8〉 ∨ 〈q≤0.3〉, 〈p≤0.3〉}. Let ψ be
〈q≤0.6〉. It follows that ♯(Σ) = {p ∨ ¬q,¬p}. It is easily verified that Σ|≈〈q≤0.6〉
and that ♯(Σ) |=2 ¬q, thereby confirming Proposition 2.1.
The converse of Proposition 2.1 does not hold in the general case.
Example 2.3. Let Σ be the set Σ = {〈p≤0.5〉∨ 〈q≥0.6〉, 〈p≥0.3〉}. It follows that
♯(Σ) = {¬p∨ q, p}. It is easily verified that ♯(Σ) |=2 q, but Σ 6|≈〈q≥n〉, for all n > 0.
The following result establishes the converse of Proposition 2.1. It directly relates
to a similar result described in [Lee 1972]. We say that a meta proposition ψ is
normalised iff for each meta literal ψ′ occurring in ψ,
(1) if ψ′ is 〈p≥n〉 then n > 0.5;
(2) if ψ′ is 〈p≤n〉 then n < 0.5;
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(3) if ψ′ is 〈p>n〉 then n ≥ 0.5;
(4) if ψ′ is 〈p<n〉 then n ≤ 0.5.
Proposition 2.4 [Straccia 2000]. Let Σ be a meta theory and let ψ be a meta
proposition. Furthermore, we assume that each ψ′ ∈ Σ is normalised as well as is
an equivalent NNF of ¬ψ. Then
(1 ) Σ is satisfiable iff ♯(Σ) is classically satisfiable;
(2 ) Σ|≈ψ iff ♯(Σ) |=2 ♯(ψ), where |=2 is classical entailment.
Example 2.5. Consider Example 2.2. An equivalent NNF of ¬ψ is ψ′ = 〈q>0.6〉.
It is easily verified that both Σ and ψ are normalised. Indeed, both Σ|≈ψ and
♯(Σ) |=2 ♯(ψ) hold. On the other hand, in Example 2.3, Σ is not normalised, e.g.
for 〈p≥0.3〉 we have 0.3 < 0.5.
Dually to normalisation, we say that a meta proposition ψ is sub-normalised iff for
each meta literal ψ′ occurring in ψ,
(1) if ψ′ is 〈p≥n〉 then n ≤ 0.5;
(2) if ψ′ is 〈p≤n〉 then n ≥ 0.5;
(3) if ψ′ is 〈p>n〉 then n < 0.5;
(4) if ψ′ is 〈p<n〉 then n > 0.5.
Furthermore, for any letter p and meta proposition ψ, let (max ∅ = 0,min ∅ = 1):
p
≥
ψ = max{n : 〈p≥n〉 occurs in ψ} (2)
p>ψ = max{n : 〈p>n〉 occurs in ψ} (3)
p
≤
ψ = min{n : 〈p≤n〉 occurs in ψ} (4)
p<ψ = min{n : 〈p<n〉 occurs in ψ}. (5)
For any p and ψ, p≥ψ , p
>
ψ and p
≤
ψ , p
<
ψ , determine the greatest lower bound and the
least upper bound which p’s truth value has to satisfy, respectively. We extend the
above definition to the case of meta theories as follows:
p
≥
Σ = max{p
≥
ψ : ψ ∈ Σ} (6)
p>Σ = max{p
>
ψ : ψ ∈ Σ} (7)
p
≤
Σ = min{p
≤
ψ : ψ ∈ Σ} (8)
p<Σ = min{p
<
ψ : ψ ∈ Σ}. (9)
The following proposition holds.
Proposition 2.6. Let ψ be a sub-normalised meta proposition in NNF. Then
ψ is satisfiable.
Proof. For any letter p consider p≥ψ , p
>
ψ , p
≤
ψ and p
<
ψ . Since ψ is sub-normalised
it follows that for each letter p, there is ǫp ≥ 0 such that
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p = max{p≥ψ , p
>
ψ + ǫp} ≤ min{p
≤
ψ , p
<
ψ − ǫp} = p (10)
i.e., for each p, its greatest lower bound constraint is less or equal than its least
upper bound constraint. Now, let I be an interpretation such that
(1) ⊤I = 1 and ⊥I = 0;
(2) pI = p, for all letters p .
We will show on induction on the number of connectives of ψ that I is an interpre-
tation satisfying ψ.
ψ is a meta letter.
(1) Suppose ψ is a meta letter 〈p≥n〉. By definition, n ≤ p and, thus, I satisfies
〈p≥n〉.
(2) Suppose ψ is a meta letter 〈p≤n〉. By definition, n ≥ p ≥ p and, thus, I
satisfies 〈p≤n〉.
Induction step.
(1) Suppose ψ is a meta proposition ψ1∧ψ2. By induction on ψ1 and ψ2, I satisfies
ψ1 and ψ2 and, thus, I satisfies ψ.
(2) The cases ∨ is similar.
✷
The above property is easily generalised to sub-normalised meta theories. We say
that a meta theory Σ is sub-normalised iff each element of it is.
Corollary 2.7. Let Σ be a sub-normalised meta theory in NNF. Then Σ is
satisfiable.
Proof. Similarly to Proposition 2.6, for any letter p, consider p≥Σ , p
>
Σ , p
≤
Σ and
p<Σ . Since Σ is sub-normalised, it follows that for each letter p, there is ǫp ≥ 0 such
that p = max{p≥, p>+ǫp} ≤ min{p≤, p<−ǫp} = p. Now, let I be an interpretation
such that
(1) ⊤I = 1 and ⊥I = 0;
(2) pI = p, for all letters p .
It is easily verified that I satisfies Σ. ✷
As it happens for classical entailment, entailment in Lf can be reduced to satisfia-
bility checking: indeed, for a meta theory Σ and a meta proposition ψ
Σ|≈ψ iff Σ ∪ {¬ψ} is unsatisfiable. (11)
We conclude this section by showing that the computation of the least upper bound
can be reduced to the computation of the greatest lower bound. Let Σ be a meta
theory and let A be a proposition. By (1), 〈A≤n〉 ≡ 〈¬A≥1− n〉 holds and, thus,
Σ|≈〈A≤n〉 iff Σ|≈〈¬A≥1− n〉 holds. Therefore,
1− lub(Σ, A) = 1− inf{n : Σ|≈〈A≤n〉}
= sup{1− n : Σ|≈〈A≤n〉}
= sup{n : Σ|≈〈A≤1− n〉}
= sup{n : Σ|≈〈¬A≥n〉}
= glb(Σ,¬A)
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and, thus,
lub(Σ, A) = 1− glb(Σ,¬A), (12)
i.e. the lub can be determined through the glb (and vice-versa).
In [Straccia 2000] a simple method has been developed in order to compute the glb.
The method is based on the fact that from Σ it is possible to determine a finite set
NΣ ⊂ [0, 1], where |NΣ| is O(|Σ|), such that glb(Σ, A) ∈ NΣ. Therefore, glb(Σ, A)
can be determined by computing the greatest value n ∈ NΣ such that Σ|≈〈A≥n〉}.
An easy way to search for this n is to order the elements of NΣ and then to perform
a binary search among these values.
Proposition 2.8 [Straccia 2000]. Let Σ be a meta theory. Then glb(Σ, A) ∈
NΣ, where
NΣ = {0, 0.5, 1} ∪
{n : 〈p≥n〉 or 〈p>n〉 occurs in Σ} ∪
{1− n : 〈p≤n〉 or 〈p<n〉 occurs in Σ}.
(13)
For instance, for the meta theory in Example 2.2, NΣ is given by {0, 0.5, 1} ∪
{0.8, 0.7}. The value of glb(Σ, A) can, thus, be determined in O(log |NΣ|) entail-
ment tests.
Note that, since for a propositionA, 〈A<0.5〉 is normalised, it follows from Propo-
sition 2.4 that |=2 A iff |≈〈A≥0.5〉, i.e. the truth-value of a classical propositional
tautology is greater or equal than 0.5. But, by Proposition 2.8, glb(∅, A) ∈ {0, 0.5}
and, thus, |=2 A iff glb(∅, A) = 0.5, i.e. a classical tautology has 0.5 as its greatest
truth-value lover bound.
2.3 Decision procedure in Lf
In this section we will present a procedure for deciding the main problem within
Lf : deciding whether a meta theory Σ is satisfiable or not (by (11), the entailment
problem is solved too). We call it the fuzzy SAT problem in order to distinguish it
from the classical SAT problem.
We recall here a simplified version of the decision procedure proposed in [Strac-
cia 2000]. Given two meta propositions ψ1 and ψ2 we say that (i) ψ1 subsumes
ψ2 (denoted by subs(ψ1, ψ2)) iff ψ1|≈ψ2; and that (ii) ψ1 and ψ2 are pairwise con-
tradictory (denoted by ctd(ψ1, ψ2)) iff ψ1|≈¬ψ2. For instance, 〈p≥0.3〉 ∨ 〈q≤0.6〉
subsumes 〈p≥0.2〉 ∨ 〈q≤0.9〉, while 〈p≥0.3〉 ∨ 〈q≤0.6〉 and 〈p≤0.2〉 ∧ 〈q≥0.7〉 are
pairwise contradictory. Since ψ1|≈¬ψ2 iff ψ2|≈¬ψ1 it follows that ctd(·, ·) is sym-
metric. By definition, ctd(ψ1, ψ2) iff subs(ψ1,¬ψ2) holds which relates ctd(·, ·) to
subs(·, ·). If ψ1 and ψ2 are two meta literals, it is quite easy to check whether
subs(ψ1, ψ2) holds, as shown in Table I, on the left. Each entry in the table spec-
ifies the condition under which ψ1 subsumes ψ2. We are now ready to specify the
calculus. The calculus is based on the following set of rules, RT = {(⊥), (∧), (∨)},
described in Table II. As usual, a deduction is represented as a tree, called deduc-
tion tree. A branch φ in a deduction tree is closed iff it contains ⊥. A deduction
tree is closed iff each branch in it is closed. With φM we indicate the set of meta
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Table I. On the left: ψ1 subsumes ψ2. On the right: ψ1 and ψ2 pairwise contradictory.
ψ1 ψ2
〈p≥m〉 〈p>m〉 〈p≤m〉 〈p<m〉
〈p≥n〉 n ≥ m n > m × ×
〈p>n〉 n ≥ m n ≥ m × ×
〈p≤n〉 × × n ≤ m n < m
〈p<n〉 × × n ≤ m n ≤ m
ψ1 ψ2
〈p≥m〉 〈p>m〉
〈p≤n〉 n < m n ≤ m
〈p<n〉 n ≤ m n ≤ m
Table II. Simple Tableaux inference rules for Lf .
(⊥) ψ, ψ
′
⊥ where ψ, ψ′ are meta literals and ctd(ψ, ψ′)
(∧) ψ1 ∧ ψ2
ψ1, ψ2
(∨) ψ1 ∨ ψ2
ψ1 ψ2
procedure SAT(Σ)
Convert each ψ ∈ Σ into an equivalent NNF. SAT(Σ) starts from the root labelled Σ. So, we
initialise Φ with Φ = {φ}, where φM = Σ. Φ is managed as a multiset, i.e. there could be
elements in Φ which are replicated.
(1) if Φ = ∅ then return false and exit;
/* all branches are closed and, thus, Σ is unsatisfiable */
(2) otherwise, select a branch φ ∈ Φ and remove it from Φ, i.e. Φ← Φ \ {φ};
(3) try to apply a rule to φ with the following priority among the rules: (⊥) ≻ (∧) ≻ (∨):
(a) if the (⊥) rule is applicable to φ then go to step 1.
(b) if the (∧) rule is applicable to φ then expand φ by the application of the (∧) rule. Let
φ′ be the resulting branch. If φ′ is not closed then add it to Φ, i.e. Φ ← Φ ∪ {φ′}; Go
to step 1.
(c) if the (∨) rule is applicable to φ then expand φ by the application of the (∨) rule. Let
φ1 and φ2 be the resulting branches. For each φi, i = 1, 2, if φi is not closed then add
it to Φ, i.e. Φ← Φ ∪ {φi}. Go to step 1.
(d) otherwise, if no rule is applicable to φ, then return true and exit.
/* φ is completed and, thus, Σ is satisfiable */
end SAT
Fig. 1. The procedure SAT.
propositions occurring in φ. A meta theory Σ has a refutation iff each deduction
tree is closed. A branch φ is completed iff it is not closed and no rule can be further
applied to it. A branch φ is open iff it is not closed and not completed.
Given a meta theory Σ, the procedure SAT(Σ) described in Figure 1 determines
whether Σ is satisfiable or not. SAT(Σ) starts from the root labelled Σ and applies
the rules until the resulting tree is either closed or there is a completed branch.
If the tree is closed, SAT(Σ) returns false, otherwise true and from the completed
branch a model of Σ can be build. The set of not closed branches φ which may be
expanded during the deduction is hold by Φ.
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{〈p≥0.5〉 ∨ (〈q≥0.4〉 ∧ 〈u≥0.6〉), 〈p≤0.3〉}
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
〈p≥0.5〉
⊥
×
〈q≥0.4〉 ∧ 〈u≥0.6〉
〈q≥0.4〉, 〈u≥0.6〉,
φ
Fig. 2. Deduction tree for Σ.
Example 2.9. Let Σ be the set
Σ = {〈p≥0.5〉 ∨ (〈q≥0.4〉 ∧ 〈u≥0.6〉), 〈p≤0.3〉}
Figure 2 shows a deduction tree produced by SAT(Σ). The branch on the left is
closed, while the branch φ on the right is completed. Consider φ′M ⊆ φM where
φ′M contains all the meta literals occurring in φM , i.e.
φ′M = {〈p≤0.3〉, 〈q≥0.4〉, 〈u≥0.6〉}.
From φ′M a model I of Σ can easily be build as follows: pI = 0.3, qI = 0.4 and
uI = 0.6.
The following proposition establishing correctness and completeness of the SAT
procedure.
Proposition 2.10 [Straccia 2000]. Let Σ be a meta theory. Then SAT(Σ)
iff Σ is satisfiable.
3. FOUR-VALUED PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC
The four-valued propositional logic we will rely on can be found in [Anderson and
Belnap 1975; Belnap 1977; Dunn 1986; Levesque 1984; Straccia 1997; Straccia
1999]. In the following we will describe briefly syntax, semantics, basic properties
and a decision procedure for the four-valued entailment problem.
Expressions in four-valued propositional logic are propositions in which no ⊤
and ⊥ appear. A theory is a set of propositions. From a semantics point of
view, a four-valued interpretation I maps a proposition into an element of 2{t,f} =
{∅, {t}, {f}, {t, f}}. The four truth-values, ∅, {t}, {f}, {t, f} stand for unknown,
true, false and contradiction, respectively. Furthermore, I has to satisfy the
following equations:
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t ∈ (A ∧B)I iff t ∈ AI and t ∈ BI ;
f ∈ (A ∧B)I iff f ∈ AI or f ∈ BI ;
t ∈ (A ∨B)I iff t ∈ AI or t ∈ BI ;
f ∈ (A ∨B)I iff f ∈ AI and f ∈ BI ;
t ∈ (¬A)I iff f ∈ AI
f ∈ (¬A)I iff t ∈ AI .
It is worth noting that a two-valued interpretation is just a four-valued interpre-
tation I such that pI ∈ {{t}, {f}}, for each letter p. We might characterise the
distinction between two-valued and four-valued semantics as the distinction be-
tween implicit and explicit falsehood: in a two-valued logic a formula is (implicitly)
false in an interpretation iff it is not true, while in a four-valued logic this need not
be the case. Our truth conditions are always given in terms of belongings ∈ (and
never in terms of non belongings 6∈) of truth-values to interpretations. Let I be a
four-valued interpretation, let A,B be two propositions and let Σ be a theory: I
satisfies (is a model of) A iff t ∈ AI ; I satisfies (is a model of) Σ iff I is a model
of each element of Σ; A and B are equivalent (written A ≡4 B) iff they have the
same models; Σ entails B (written Σ |=4 B) iff all models of Σ are models of B.
Without loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to propositions in NNF
only, as ¬¬A ≡4 A, ¬(A ∧ B) ≡4 ¬A ∨ ¬B and ¬(A ∨ B) ≡4 ¬A ∧ ¬B hold. For
easy of notation, we will write A |=4 B in place of {A} |=4 B.
The following relations can easily be verified:
A ∧B |=4 A
A1 |=4 A2 and A2 |=4 A3 implies A1 |=4 A3
A |=4 A ∨B
A ∧ (¬A ∨B) 6|=4 B
A |=4 B implies ¬B |=4 ¬A
A |=4 B implies A |=2 B .
Note that there are no tautologies, i.e. there is no A such that |=4 A, e.g. 6|=4
p∨ ¬p (consider I such that pI = ∅). Moreover, every theory is satisfiable. Hence,
p ∧ ¬p 6|=4 q, as there is a model I (p
I = {t, f}, qI = ∅) of p ∧ ¬p not satisfying q.
Moreover, |=4 is a subset of classical entailment |=2, i.e. |=4 is sound w.r.t. classical
entailment.
In [Straccia 1997] a simple procedure, deciding whether Σ |=4 A holds, has been
presented. The calculus, a tableaux, is based on signed propositions of type α
(“conjunctive propositions”) and of type β (“disjunctive propositions”) and on their
components which are defined as usual [Smullyan 1968]:2
α α1 α2
TA ∧B TA TB
NTA ∨ B NTA NTB
β β1 β2
TA ∨B TA TB
NTA ∧ B NTA NTB
TA and NTA are called conjugated signed propositions. An interpretation I satisfies
TA iff I satisfies A, whereas I satisfies NTA iff I does not satisfy A. A set of signed
propositions is satisfiable iff each element of it is satisfiable. Therefore,
2T and NT play the role of “True” and “Not True”, respectively. In classical calculi NT may be
replaced with F (“False”).
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Table III. Simple Tableaux inference rules for four-valued L.
(⊥4) Tp, NTp
⊥
(∧4) α
α1, α2
(∨4) β
β1 β2
Tp ∧ (q ∨ r), NT(p ∨ r) ∧ (q ∨ r ∨ s)
Tp, Tq ∨ r
✥✥✥✥✥✥✥
❵❵❵❵❵❵❵
NTp ∨ r
NTp, NTr
⊥
×
NTq ∨ r ∨ s
NTq, NTr, NTs
✥✥✥✥
❵❵❵❵
Tq
⊥
×
Tr
⊥
×
Fig. 3. Deduction tree for p ∧ (q ∨ r) |=4 (p ∨ r) ∧ (q ∨ r ∨ s).
Σ |=4 A iff TΣ ∪ {NTA} is not satisfiable, (14)
where TΣ = {TA : A ∈ Σ}.
We present here a simplified version of the calculus for signed propositions in
NNF, which is based on the set of rules, RT4 = {(⊥
4), (∧4), (∨4)}, described in
Table III. With SAT4 we indicate the decision procedure that decides whether a
set of signed propositions is (four-valued) satisfiable or not: SAT4 derives directly
from SAT in Table 1, where the deduction rules RT for Lf have been replaced with
the set of rules RT4 for four-valued propositional logic.
It has been shown in [Straccia 1997] that Σ |=4 A iff SAT4(TΣ ∪ {NTA}) returns
false. For instance, Figure 3 is a closed deduction tree for p∧(q∨r) |=4 (p∨r)∧(q∨
r ∨ s). Note that, if we switch to the classical two-valued setting, soundness and
completeness is obtained by extending signed propositions as usual: just consider
additionally the following signed propositions of type α.
α α1 α2
T¬A NTA NTA
NT¬A TA TA
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Therefore, in the general case the only difference between four-valued and two-
valued semantics relies on the negation connective. This is not a surprise as we
already said that the semantics for the negation is constructive, i.e. expressed in
terms of ∈ rather than on 6∈.
The following proposition establishes correctness and completeness of the SAT4
procedure.
Proposition 3.1 [Straccia 1997]. Let S be a set of signed propositions. Then
SAT4(S) iff S is four-valued satisfiable.
4. RELATIONS AMONG FUZZY ENTAILMENTAND FOUR-VALUED ENTAILMENT
The objective of this section is to establish some relationships between fuzzy and
four-valued propositional logic.
At first, we show that
Proposition 4.1. Let A and B be two propositions. If (i) A |=4 B or (ii)
|=2 ¬A ∧B then for all n > 0, 〈A≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉.
Proof. (i) Assume A |=4 B and suppose to the contrary that there is an n′ > 0
such that 〈A≥n′〉 6|≈〈B≥n′〉. Therefore, there is a fuzzy interpretation I ′ such that
AI
′
≥ n′ and BI
′
< n′. Let I be the following four-valued interpretation:
t ∈ pI iff pI
′
≥ n′
f ∈ pI iff 1− pI
′
≥ n′.
We show on induction on the structure of a proposition C that I ′ satisfies 〈C≥n′〉
iff t ∈ CI .
Case letter p. If I ′ satisfies 〈p≥n′〉 then pI
′
≥ n′. By definition, t ∈ pI follows.
If I ′ does not satisfy 〈p≥n′〉 then pI
′
< n′. By definition, t 6∈ pI follows.
Case literal ¬p. If I ′ satisfies 〈¬p≥n′〉 then 1 − pI
′
≥ n′. By definition, f ∈ pI
follows and, thus, t ∈ ¬pI . If I ′ does not satisfy 〈¬p≥n′〉 then 1 − pI
′
< n′. By
definition, f 6∈ pI follows and, thus, t 6∈ ¬pI .
Case A1 ∧A2. If I ′ satisfies 〈A1 ∧ A2≥n′〉 then A1
I′ ≥ n′ and A2
I′ ≥ n′. By
induction on A1 and A2, both t ∈ A1
I and t ∈ A2
I hold and, thus, t ∈ (A1 ∧A2)
I
.
The case A1 ∨ A2 is similar.
As a consequence, since I ′ satisfies 〈A≥n′〉 but not 〈B≥n′〉, it follows that t ∈ AI
and t 6∈ BI , which is contrary to the assumption A |=4 B.
(ii) Assume that |=2 ¬A∧B holds, i.e. |=2 B and |=2 ¬A. Consider n ∈ (0, 1]. Then
either n ≤ 0.5 or n > 0.5. From |=2 B it follows that glb(∅, B) = 0.5, i.e. |≈〈B≥n〉.
Therefore, for n ≤ 0.5, 〈A≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉 follows. From |=2 ¬A, glb(∅,¬A) = 0.5
follows, i.e. lub(∅, A) = 0.5. As a consequence, for n > 0.5, 〈A≥n〉 is unsatisfiable
and, thus, 〈A≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉 holds. Therefore, for all n > 0 〈A≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉 holds. ✷
Proposition 4.2. Let A and B be two propositions. If 6|=2 B and A 6|=4 B then
there is a four-valued interpretation I such that t ∈ AI, t 6∈ BI and for no letter p,
pI = ∅.
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Proof. Since A 6|=4 B, SAT4({TA, NTB}) returns true. Therefore, there is a
completed branch φ. Suppose that for each completed branch φi, 1 ≤ i ≤ b, there
is a letter pi occurring in B such that both NTpi ∈ φMi and NT¬pi ∈ φ
M
i . As
a consequence, collecting all the NT expressions in branches φi, informally NTB is
equivalent to
NTB ≡
∨b
i=1(NTpi ∧ NT¬pi ∧ NTFi)
≡
∨b
i=1(NT(pi ∨ ¬pi ∨ Fi)
≡ NT
∧b
i=1(pi ∨ ¬pi ∨ Fi)
and, thus, B is classically equivalent to
∧
i(pi ∨ ¬pi ∨ Fi). It follows that |=2 B,
contrary to our assumption. Therefore, there is a completed branch φ such that for
any letter p occurring in B,
(1) if NTp ∈ φM then NT¬p 6∈ φM and Tp 6∈ φM ;
(2) if NT¬p ∈ φM then NTp 6∈ φM and T¬p 6∈ φM .
Let I be the following four-valued interpretation:
t ∈ pI iff Tp ∈ φM
f ∈ pI iff T¬p ∈ φM
pI = {f} iff NTp ∈ φM
pI = {t} iff NT¬p ∈ φM .
It follows that for any letter p, pI 6= ∅. Furthermore, it can easily be shown on
induction on the structure of A and B that I satisfies both TA and NTB. Therefore,
t ∈ AI and t 6∈ BI . ✷
Proposition 4.3. Let A and B be two propositions and consider 0 < n ≤ 0.5.
〈A≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉 iff |=2 B or A |=4 B.
Proof.
⇒ .) Assume 0 < n ≤ 0.5 and 〈A≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉. If |≈〈B≥n〉 then |=2 B, by Propo-
sition 2.1. Otherwise, 6|≈〈B≥n〉 implies 6|=2 B (as a NNF of ¬〈B≥n〉 is normalised
and by Proposition 2.4). So, let us show that A |=4 B. Suppose to the contrary
that A 6|=4 B. From Proposition 4.2, there is an interpretation I such that t ∈ AI ,
t 6∈ BI and for no letter p, pI = ∅. Consider the following fuzzy interpretation I ′:
(1) if pI = {t} then pI
′
= 1;
(2) if pI = {f} then pI
′
= 0;
(3) if pI = {t, f} then pI
′
= 0.5.
Let us show on induction of the structure of any proposition C and any 0 < n ≤ 0.5
that t ∈ CI iff CI
′
≥ n holds.
Case letter p. By definition, t ∈ pI implies pI
′
= 1 and, thus, pI
′
≥ n. On the
other hand, t 6∈ pI implies pI = {f} and, thus, pI
′
= 0. As a consequence, pI
′
< n;
Case literal ¬p. t ∈ (¬p)I implies f ∈ pI . Therefore, either pI
′
= 0 or pI
′
= 0.5.
As a consequence, (¬p)I
′
= 1 − pI
′
≥ n (n ≤ 0.5). On the other hand, t 6∈ (¬p)I
implies f 6∈ pI . Therefore, pI = {t} and, by definition, pI
′
= 1 follows. As a
consequence, (¬p)I
′
= 1− pI
′
= 0 < n;
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Cases A1 ∧A2 and A1 ∨ A2. Straightforward.
Therefore, from t ∈ AI it follows that I ′ satisfies 〈A≥n〉. From t 6∈ BI it follows
that I ′ does not satisfy 〈B≥n〉, contrary to the assumption that 〈A≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉
holds.
⇐ .) From A |=4 B and from Proposition 4.1 for all n ∈ (0, 1], 〈A≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉
follows. Otherwise, if |=2 B then |≈〈B≥0.5〉 and, thus, for any 0 < n ≤ 0.5
〈A≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉. ✷
Proposition 4.3 can be generalised as follows. At first, we show that
Proposition 4.4. Let ψ1 and ψ2 be two meta propositions such that ψ1 is sub-
normalised and let n ∈ (0, 0.5]. If ψ1|≈ψ2 then 〈♯(ψ1)≥n〉|≈〈♯(ψ2)≥n〉.
Proof. Assume ψ1|≈ψ2. Mark all meta-literals in ψ2 with ∗. Consider a deduc-
tion of SAT({ψ1,¬ψ2}), which returns false, and let T be the deduction tree. As a
consequence, all branches φ in T are closed.
Let us consider the following substitution, (·), in each branch φ. For each meta
literal ψ occurring in φM , (i) if ψ = 〈p r m〉 is not marked with ∗ then for r ∈ {≥, >}
replace ψ with 〈p r n〉 and for r ∈ {≤, <} replace ψ with 〈p r 1− n〉; and (ii) if
ψ = 〈p r m〉∗ is marked with ∗ then for r ∈ {≥, >} replace ψ with 〈p>1− n〉 and
for r ∈ {≤, <} replace ψ with 〈p<n〉. ⊥ is mapped into it. Let ψ and φ be the
result of this substitution, for each meta proposition ψ and for each (closed) branch
φ, respectively.
We show on induction of the depth d of each branch φ in the deduction tree T ,
that φ is a branch in a deduction tree of SAT({〈♯(ψ1)≥n〉, 〈♯(ψ2)<n〉}) and, thus, the
tree T formed out by the (closed) branches φ, for φ branch in T , is a closed deduction
tree for SAT({〈♯(ψ1)≥n〉, 〈♯(ψ2)<n〉}). Therefore, 〈♯(ψ1)≥n〉|≈〈♯(ψ2)≥n〉.
Case d = 1. Therefore, there is an unique closed branch φ in T as the result
of the application of the (⊥) rule, i.e. φM = {ψ1,¬ψ2,⊥}. Since φ is closed,
ctd(ψ1,¬ψ2). There are eight possible cases for r, r′ ∈ {≥, >,≤, <} such that
ψ1 = 〈p r k〉, ¬ψ2 ∼= 〈p r′ m〉∗ and ctd(ψ1,¬ψ2). Let us consider the cases (a)
ψ1 = 〈p≥k〉, ¬ψ2 ∼= 〈p≤m〉∗. By definition, φ
M
is {〈p≥n〉, 〈p<n〉∗,⊥}. There-
fore, φ is a closed branch of a deduction tree for SAT({〈♯(ψ1)≥n〉, 〈♯(ψ2)<n〉})
= SAT({〈p≥n〉, 〈p<n〉}); (b) ψ1 = 〈p≤k〉, ¬ψ2 ∼= 〈p≥m〉∗. By definition, φ
M
is
{〈p≤1− n〉, 〈p>1− n〉∗,⊥}. Therefore, φ is a closed branch of a deduction tree for
SAT({〈♯(ψ1)≥n〉, 〈♯(ψ2)<n〉}) = SAT({〈¬p≥n〉, 〈¬p<n〉}). The other cases can be
shown similarly.
Case d > 1. Consider a branch φ of depth d > 1. φ is the result of the application
of one of the rules in RT to a branch φ′ of depth d− 1. On induction on φ′, φ′ is
a branch in a deduction tree of SAT({〈♯(ψ1)≥n〉, 〈♯(ψ2)<n〉}). Let us show that φ
is still a branch in a deduction tree of SAT({〈♯(ψ1)≥n〉, 〈♯(ψ2)<n〉}). (1) Suppose
that rule (∧) has been applied to ψ∧ψ′ ∈ φ′M and, thus, ψ, ψ′ ∈ φM . By definition
of (·), (ψ ∧ ψ′) is in φ′
M
, i.e. ψ ∧ ψ′ is in φ′
M
. As a consequence, the (∧) rule
can be applied to it and, thus, ψ and ψ′ are in φ′
M
. (2) the case of rule (∨) is
similar. Finally, (3) suppose that rule (⊥) has been applied to literals ψ, ψ′ ∈ φ′M
such that ctd(ψ, ψ′) and ⊥∈ φM . By definition of (·), ψ and ψ′ are in φ′
M
. Now,
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we proceed similarly to the case d = 1. As ψ1 is sub-normalised, either ψ or ψ
′
has to be marked with ∗. Without loss of generality, we can distinguish two cases
(i) only ψ′ is marked with ∗; and (ii) both ψ and ψ′ are marked with ∗. Let us
consider case (i). There are eight possible cases for r, r′ ∈ {≥, >,≤, <} such that
ψ = 〈p r n〉, ψ′ = 〈p r′ m〉∗ and ctd(ψ, ψ′). Let us consider the case (a) ψ = 〈p≥k〉,
ψ′ = 〈p≤m〉∗. By definition, φ′
M
contains both 〈p≥n〉 and 〈p<n〉∗, which are
pairwise contradictory. Therefore, rule (⊥) can be applied to φ′ and φ
M
contains
⊥ and, thus, φ is closed; (b) ψ = 〈p≤k〉, ψ′ = 〈p≥m〉∗. By definition, φ′
M
contains
both 〈p≤1− n〉 and 〈p>1− n〉∗, which are pairwise contradictory. Therefore, rule
(⊥) can be applied to φ′ and φ
M
contains ⊥ and, thus, φ is closed. The other
cases are similar. Finally, consider the case (ii) both ψ and ψ′ are marked with
∗. Without loss of generality, there are four possible cases for r, r′ ∈ {≥, >,≤, <}
such that ψ = 〈p r n〉∗, ψ′ = 〈p r′ m〉∗ and ctd(ψ, ψ′). Let us consider the case
ψ = 〈p≥k〉∗, ψ′ = 〈p≤m〉∗. By definition, φ′
M
contains both 〈p>1− n〉 and 〈p<n〉∗,
which are pairwise contradictory, for n ∈ (0, 0.5]. Then proceed similarly as above.
The other cases are similar.
✷
Note that the converse of the above proposition does not hold. For instance, given
n ∈ (0, 0.5], 〈p≥n〉|≈〈p ∨ q≥n〉, but 〈p≥0.2〉 6|≈〈p≥0.3〉 ∨ 〈p≥0.1〉.
Proposition 4.5. Let ψ1 and ψ2 be two meta propositions such that ψ1 is sub-
normalised. If ψ1|≈ψ2 then either |=2 ♯(ψ2) or ♯(ψ1) |=4 ♯(ψ2).
Proof. From hypothesis, from Proposition 4.3 and Proposition 4.4 it follows
immediately that either |=2 ♯(ψ2) or ♯(ψ1) |=4 ♯(ψ2) holds. ✷
As a meta theory is equivalent to a conjunction of meta propositions, we have
immediately,
Proposition 4.6. Let Σ be a sub-normalised meta theory and let ψ be a meta
proposition. If Σ|≈ψ then either |=2 ♯(ψ) or ♯(Σ) |=4 ♯(ψ).
The converse of the above propositions does not hold. Indeed, p |=4 p ∨ q, but
〈p≥0.2〉 6|≈〈p≥0.3〉 ∨ 〈p≥0.1〉.
Dually to Proposition 4.3 we have
Proposition 4.7. Let A and B be two propositions and consider 0.5 < n ≤ 1.
〈A≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉 iff for a DNF A1 ∨ . . .∨Al of A and for each j = 1, . . . l, either (i)
|=2 ¬Aj or (ii) Aj |=4 B.
Proof.
⇒ .) Assume n > 0.5 and 〈A≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉. Consider a DNF A1∨. . .∨Al of A. From
〈A≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉 it follows that
∨l
j=1〈Aj≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉 and, thus, for each j = 1, . . . l,
〈Aj≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉, i.e. Sj = {〈Aj≥n〉, 〈B<n〉} is unsatisfiable. Mark all the meta
literals in a NNF of B with ∗. Let φ1, . . . , φh be all the branches of a deduction of
SAT(Sj). Consider a branch φi. Obviously, φi is closed. Therefore, there are meta
literals ψi, ψ
′
i ∈ φ
M
i such that ctd(ψi, ψ
′
i). Consider the four pairs for ψi and ψ
′
i,
respectively:
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〈p≥n〉 , 〈p≤1− n〉 (15)
〈p≥n〉 , 〈p<n〉∗ (16)
〈p≤1− n〉 , 〈p>1− n〉∗ (17)
〈p<n〉∗ , 〈p>1− n〉∗ (18)
At first, if (15) is the case (n > 0.5) then Aj is unsatisfiable, i.e. |=2 ¬Aj and, thus,
condition (i) is satisfied. Second, (18) cannot be the case as n > 0.5. So, for the
other cases, we can assume that Aj is satisfiable.
Let us consider the following transformation S♯(·) for each branch φi. For each
meta literal ψ occurring in φM , (i) if ψ = 〈p≥n〉 is not marked with ∗ then ψ 7→ Tp;
(ii) if ψ = 〈p≤1− n〉 is not marked with ∗ then ψ 7→ T¬p; (iii) if ψ = 〈p<n〉∗ is
marked with ∗ then ψ 7→ NTp; and (iv) if ψ = 〈p>1− n〉∗ is marked with ∗ then
ψ 7→ NT¬p. Let S♯(ψ), S♯(φ) and S♯(S) be the result of this transformation, for each
meta proposition ψ, for each branch φi and for each set of meta propositions S,
respectively.
Similarly to Proposition 4.4, it can be shown on induction of the depth d of each
branch φi of a deduction SAT(Sj), that the branch S♯(φi) is a closed branch of a
four-valued deduction SAT4(S♯(Sj)). But, S♯(Sj) is {TAj, NTB} and, thus, Aj |=4 B.
In the induction proof, it suffices to show that if ctd(ψi, ψ
′
i) then ctd(S♯(ψi), S♯(ψ
′
i)),
i.e. if the (⊥) rule is applicable to φi then the (⊥)4 rule is applicable to S♯(φi). For
the other rules the proof is immediate. So, as we have seen above, either case
(16) or case (17) holds. If (16) is the case then S♯(ψ) = Tp and S♯(ψ′) = NTp
and, thus, ctd(S♯(ψi), S♯(ψ
′
i)). Otherwise, if (17) is the case then S♯(ψ) = T¬p and
S♯(ψ′) = NT¬p and, thus, ctd(S♯(ψi), S♯(ψ′i)), which completes ⇒ .).
⇐ .) Consider n > 0.5. It suffices to show that for each j = 1, . . . l, if either
|=2 ¬Aj or Aj |=4 B then 〈Aj≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉. If |=2 ¬Aj then 〈Aj≥n〉 is unsatis-
fiable, as n > 0.5 and, thus 〈Aj≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉. Otherwise, if Aj |=4 B then, by
Proposition 4.1, it follows that 〈Aj≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉. ✷
We conclude with
Proposition 4.8. Let A and B be two propositions, n1 ≤ 0.5 and n2 > 0.5. It
follows that, for both n ∈ {n1, n2}, 〈A≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉 iff either (i) A |=4 B; or (ii)
|=2 ¬A ∧B holds.
Proof. ⇒ .) Assume that for both n ∈ {n1, n2}, 〈A≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉 holds. If
A |=4 B then condition (i) is trivially satisfied. Otherwise, assume A 6|=4 B. From
Proposition 4.3, |=2 B follows. But then, we know that glb(∅, B) = 0.5. As a
consequence, for n = n2 > 0.5 no interpretation satisfies 〈B≥n〉. Therefore, since
by hypothesis 〈A≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉 holds for n > 0.5, it follows that for n > 0.5, 〈A≥n〉
has to be unsatisfiable, i.e. |≈〈A<n〉 and, thus, |≈〈¬A>1− n〉, for n > 0.5. As a
NNF of ¬〈¬A>1− n〉 is normalised, from Proposition 2.4 it follows that |=2 ¬A.
Therefore, condition (ii) is satisfied.3
3An example of case (ii) is the following: for n = n1, n2, where n1 ≤ 0.5 and n2 > 0.5,
〈p ∧ ¬p≥n〉|≈〈q ∨ ¬q≥n〉.
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⇐ .) From Proposition 4.1 it follows directly that for all n > 0, 〈A≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉.
In particular, 〈A≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉 holds for n = n1, n2, where n1 ≤ 0.5 and n2 > 0.5. ✷
An interesting application of the above proposition is the following. Consider the
quite natural and common fuzzy entailment relation, |≈r, among propositions, de-
fined as follows (see, e.g. [Xiachun et al. 1995; Yager 1985]):
A|≈rB iff for all fuzzy interpretations I, A
I ≤ BI .
Now, it is quite easy to show that
Proposition 4.9. Let A and B be two propositions. It follows that A|≈rB iff
for all n > 0, 〈A≥n〉|≈r〈B≥n〉.
Proof. ⇒ .) Assume that A|≈rB. Suppose to the contrary that ∃n > 0 such
that 〈A≥n〉 6 |≈〈B≥n〉. Therefore, there is a fuzzy interpretation I such that AI ≥ n
and BI < n. But, from the hypothesis n ≤ AI ≤ BI < n follows. Absurd.
⇐ .) Assume that for all n > 0, 〈A≥n〉|≈〈B≥n〉. Suppose to the contrary that
A 6 |≈rB. Therefore, there is a fuzzy interpretation I such that A
I > BI . Consider
n = AI . Of course, I satisfies 〈A≥n〉. Therefore, from the hypothesis it follows
that I satisfies 〈B≥n〉, i.e. BI ≥ n = AI > BI . Absurd. ✷
Finally, we can apply Proposition 4.8 and Proposition 4.1 and obtain
Corollary 4.10. Let A and B be two propositions. It follows that A|≈rB iff
either (i) A |=4 B; or (ii) |=2 ¬A ∧B holds.
Essentially, Corollary 4.10 establishes that for all interesting cases, i.e. the theory
A is classically satisfiable and the conclusion B is not a classical tautology, fuzzy en-
tailment |≈r is equivalent to four-valued entailment |=4. In particular, Yager [1985]
further restricts |≈r to the case where the premise should be classically satisfiable
and, thus, from Corollary 4.10 it follows that A|≈rB iff A |=4 B. In fact, a closer
look to the axiomatization provided by Yager reveals that it is a (not minimal)
axiomatization for four-valued logic.
Finally, some alternative, still popular, definitions of fuzzy entailment are (see,
e.g. [Xiachun et al. 1995]):
(1) A|≈aB iff for all fuzzy interpretations I, max{1−A
I , BI} ≥ 0.5;
(2) A|≈bB iff for all fuzzy interpretations I, A
I ≥ 0.5 implies BI ≥ 0.5;
(3) A|≈cB iff for all fuzzy interpretations I, A
I > 0.5 implies BI > 0.5.
The following relations are easily verified.
(1) A|≈aB iff |≈〈¬A ∨B≥0.5〉. As 〈¬A ∨B≥0.5〉 is normalised, we already know
that this is equivalent to |=2 ¬A∨B, i.e. A |=2 B. Therefore, A|≈aB iff A |=2 B.
This result already has been proven differently in [Lee 1972];
(2) A|≈bB iff 〈A≥0.5〉|≈〈B≥0.5〉. From Proposition 4.1 and Proposition 4.3 it fol-
lows that A|≈bB iff either |=2 B or A |=4 B;
(3) A|≈cB iff 〈A>0.5〉|≈〈B>0.5〉. According to Proposition 4.7 A|≈cB iff for a DNF
A1 ∨ . . . ∨Al of A and for each j = 1, . . . l, either |=2 ¬Aj or Aj |=4 B.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have shown that there is a strict relation between various common
definitions of fuzzy entailment (|≈(·)), four-valued entailment (|=4) and two-valued
entailment (|=2). While the presented results allow to describe qualitatively what
is inferable according to |≈(·), neither |=4 nor |=2 can solve the quantitative aspect,
e.g. the computation of the greatest lower bound, glb(Σ, A).
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